Thane Gustafson's Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia is reviewed and situated within some broader trends in research on Russian natural resource extraction in the oil industry. Gustafson's book represents the high water mark of a particular genre of scholarship on oil and considerably improves our understandings on a wide range of fronts. However, a number of other methodological and analytical approaches to Soviet and post-Soviet oil are beginning to appear; in the coming years, they will broaden and diversify scholarly conversations about the significance of oil in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
exploitation -to geologists. Some of these geologists were at central Roskomnedra, but others were spread across Russia's far-flung regions, as many region-based geologists had found employment in local state agencies and small oil companies looking to retain as much profit from the oil industry as possible. The Mineral Resources Law of 1992 established the "dual key" structure in which companies had to acquire operating licenses from both center and region for their operations -or more precisely, from both central and regional geologists. Many of the struggles between and among oil companies and federal and regional state agencies played out on this terrain well into the 2000s, making geologists, for a time, central power-brokers at all levels of company-state interaction.
Through all of this, Gustafson argues that the main trend of the 1990s was the gradual sidelining of the "oil generals" -the red directors of the Soviet oil industry -and the rise of finansisty -the financiers. Mikhail Khodorkovsky at Yukos stands, of course, as exemplar of the new and swaggering financier, while two "oil generals," Vagit Alekperov of Lukoil and Vladimir Bogdanov of Surgutneftegaz, serve as the exceptions that prove Gustafson's rule about the gradual disappearance of oil generals. The outlines of this story, too, are widely known, but Gustafson's lengthy case studies of Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil, and Yukos in Chapter 3 provide enough new detail here that they considerably advance our understanding of the era. We learn, for instance, of the particular banking decisions and structures that enabled oil industry insiders at Lukoil to maintain control over the company's finances and structure its acquisitions of new subsidiaries in ways that did not cede control to banks. Likewise, we see how the highly centralized structure of the Soviet oil industry in the subset of West Siberian fields controlled by Surgutneftegaz gave Bogdanov a strong opening hand with which to resist all manner of attempted takeovers through the 1990s and into the 2000s. Less skillful banking decisions and a quite different infrastructural and geological inheritance -summarized rather blandly and not entirely satisfactorily by Gustafson as a lack of "control" -landed Yukos in the hands of Khordarkovsky and his Menatep bank and helped set the stage for the dramatic confrontations between oil industry and resurgent state in Vladimir Putin's first presidential term.
Chapter 5 opens the middle section of Wheel of Fortune with perhaps the biggest understatement of the book, directed at those who projected a continued decline for Russia following the financial crisis of 1998: "What the world's governments and pundits had missed was oil" (185). Indeed. The subsequent chapters move through the rapid rise of oil profits in the early 2000, the contemporaneous origins and consolidation of Vladimir Putin's "state capitalism," the Yukos Affair, and the subsequent emergence of Rosneft as national champion in the oil sector. In this section of the book, the careful differentiation of the oil sector by company and geological / geographical inheritance of earlier chapters pays dividends, as Gustafson is able to show how the different companies were positioned to pursue different strategies, with quite different results. Yukos took full advantage of Western technologies for squeezing oil out of its West Siberian brownfields, installing Joe Mach of the oil services multinational Schlumberger as head of production and reinforcing his oilfield management decisions with strict top-down control within the company. Other companies saw the potential in reviving existing wells less completely, focusing on new exploration instead, or else less enthusiastically adopted the Western drilling technologies and oilfield management strategies that could most effectively extract new profit from their aging fields. But Yukos's success, of course, primed it for conflict with what Gustafson calls "the brothers from St. Petersburg" -Vladimir Putin and his often-fractious team. Rejecting several other accounts of and approaches to the Yukos Affair, Gustafson places the personalities and personal relationships of those involved at the center of attention, insisting that events would have unfolded quite differently if it were not for Mikhail Khardovovsky's swashbuckling, uncompromising tendencies, especially in meetings with the President of the Russian Federation. This personality-focused account provides a wealth of detail on the inner workings of state agencies and oil companies, but it is unlikely to satisfy readers more inclined toward theoretical considerations of the interaction of states, firms, and capital in the context of a commodity boom. It does, nevertheless, work beautifully in Gustafson's overall narrative arc and style, for he is, quite masterfully, able to bring all of the forces and factors described in the preceding chapters to balance on the "knife edge" (315) of the Yukos Affair. The real dramatic center of the book is here, in the confrontation of what Gustafson calls the "oil miracle" (chudo) and the "Russian Bear." The remaining chapters all spring from the reorganization of the relationship between oil companies and federal state in and after the Yukos Affair. The first step in this process, and the conclusion to Wheel of Fortune's middle section, is the formation of Rosneft as state-owned national champion, with private oil companies occupying a second tier -a process that Gustafson convincingly portrays as contingent and largely accidental, in contrast to the unfolding of a careful, preexisting plan to undo privatization in the oil sector that more conspiracyminded observers have discerned.
The final section of Wheel of Fortune opens with the third oil crisis in as many decades -the global downturn in oil prices in 2008-9 -that rapidly reduced the flow of oil rents and drew attention to vulnerabilities that had been masked by steadily increasing profits since the previous crisis of 1998.
Gustafson takes this opportunity to provide one of the great services of the book: a systematic accounting of the nitty-gritty of Russian tax law and regulatory policy as it has related to the industry over the 1990s and 2000s. Nowhere else in English, to my knowledge, do we have such a systematic account of the actual mechanisms by which state and oil companies interact in the more quotidian transactions of business (as opposed to the more spectacular showdowns, mergers, and acquisitions that dominate headlines). Gustafson's diagnosis is that the Russian tax and regulatory system is badly in need of overhaul, as it was designed for the purposes of the 1990s and 2000s, rather than for the crisis of production and rents that looms on the horizon. Too often, he claims, tax code revisions have been used in place of the real, necessary reforms that must take place. Gustafson gives a systematic overview of the potential for future development in the old Soviet brownfields (more than one might think, if the recent "tight oil revolution" in the us can be replicated in Russia); greenfields of Eastern Siberia (overstated, as there are likely no equation-changing fields left to be found); and bluefields of the Arctic circle (requiring high-tech, long-term partnerships with Western oil companies more experienced in deep-water exploration and drilling). Gustafson makes a number of predictions and recommendations and sketches some possible scenarios.
Interspersed in the narrative of the book as I have presented it here are three chapters that focus directly on the role of foreign oil companies in Russia. A chapter on the 1990s charts the entry of Western oil majors into the "wild east," focusing on misunderstandings and mutual incomprehension at nearly every level from drilling rig to boardroom -factors that sidelined Western oil companies right along with many oil generals. A chapter on the 2000s explores the failure of Production Sharing Agreements as the Western companies' preferred legal framework for their activities in Russia and its replacement by various forms of oil services and contracting that helped to boost production in Russian brownfields. Although these chapters themselves point to frictions, missed opportunities, and fraught partnerships, they anchor an important part of the book as a whole. In Gustafson's telling, things in the Russian oil sector go well most frequently, and wise leadership is consequently to be found and praised, when Western models are implemented or adapted. This goes for Vagit Alekperov's determination to move Lukoil, and indeed the Russian oil industry, into a vertically integrated structure in the early 1990s. It went all too well in the case of Khodorkovsky at Yukos, where the installation of Western oilfield management techniques helped create the conditions of his company's undoing. And Gustafson's clearest practical recommendation of the concluding chapters is that, if there is a "tight oil" revolution to come in the brownfields of the Urals and Siberia, it must come from a new breed of small, technologically sophisticated oil and gas companies rather than lumbering giants, just as it has in the ongoing shale gas revolution in the United States. There are exceptions. The quintessential Soviet oilman and post-Soviet survivor Vladimir Bogdanov of Surgutneftegaz comes in for praise as a canny navigator of unpredictable situations, despite his insistence on going his own way and, at times, not adopting Western technologies or strategies. At the largest scale, Gustafson is not among those who counsel that Russia should diversify away from reliance on the oil industry. In his view, oil (and gas) continue to represent Russia's competitive advantage; the key will be to transform the industry into a high-tech knowledge sector, not build some other high-tech industry, as President Medvedev was fond of advocating. "For better or worse," Gustafson writes, "oil will dominate the future of Russia for years to come" (1).
Wheel of Fortune is a masterful example of an influential genre of scholarship on oil and energy, one to which Gustafson's past collaborator Daniel Yergin's recent book The Quest (2011) and Marshall Goldman's important Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (2008) also belong.1 Books in this genre tell the thrilling narrative of states, corporations, and the men who lead them involved in a parade of high stakes negotiations and decisions across realms of finance, politics, and science. There are competing institutions and factions within institutions, examples of strong, perceptive leadership and hubristic, fateful mistakes. Changes in personnel and technology, along with a range of internal and external factors, intersect to shape the course of history. Some of the most compelling parts can be anecdotal: a hostile exchange at a meeting, a chess game in the bathhouse, or the hierarchical allocation of office space at corporate headquarters. Indeed, Gustafson, like Yergin, often demonstrates an ethnographer's eye for significant local detail, particularly when it comes to subtle differences among factions of state or corporation and their relevance to a larger picture.
Books in this genre are often powered by the close relationship established between the authors and key corporate and state players though the international consulting industry -in the cases of both Yergin and Gustafson, this means ihs Cambridge Energy Associates -and they are compelling, in part, precisely because their authors are so close to the field of action they describe.2 Yet the proximity of this literature to conventionally understood corridors of power is often matched by a reluctance to engage substantively with broader historical and social scientific scholarship on the actual workings of that power. In studies of oil, at any rate, it often seems that the closer one gets to the commanding heights of states and corporations, the less one is engaged with the history and social science of states and corporations. This book is not, then, particularly theoretical. Gustafson distances himself, quite appropriately for his tale, from the large quantitative literature on the resource curse, preferring an approach that takes much more account of historical trajectories -what he terms the "curse of the living [i.e. Soviet] past" (8) -and post-Soviet contingencies than abstracted data sets concerning natural resource wealth and levels of democracy or development. He approvingly cites Brookings Institute economists Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes's "virtual economy" thesis (2002) In the remainder of this essay, I describe two trends in the study of postSoviet oil outside of mainstream political science that have the potential to expand our knowledge in ways that Wheel of Fortune -concerned as it is with the "commanding heights" and largely skirting theoretical discussions -does not. Although these trends are, at present, much more visible in scholarship focused outside Russia and the former Soviet Union, this will not be the case for much longer.
Historical scholarship on oil is useful place to begin. As I have noted, Gustafson marks his distance from some of the comparative literature on the resource curse by rooting his analysis in Soviet legacies -what he calls "the curse of the living past" -rather than the standard quantitative literature in comparative petrostate theory (e.g. Ross 2012) . But just what is the legacy of 3 See, however, work in architecture and urban planning by Blau and Rupnik (2015) and Engel (2006) on the making of space in Soviet and former Soviet oil cities.
Soviet oil? When we look for scholarship on Soviet-era oil, we find, for the most part, earlier works by Gustfason and colleagues in the contexts and conventions of Cold War political science (see Gustafson 1989 , Hewitt 1984 , Goldman 1980 , Campbell 1968 for representative examples). The Western social and cultural history of the Soviet Union has, to my knowledge, produced no major study of Soviet oil analogous to key works on Saudi Arabia , the United States (Sabin 2005) , Venezeula (Tinker Salas 2009), and most other oilproducing and consuming states.3 (This is despite the fact that, by the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest oil producer and exported quantities of oil second only to Saudi Arabia.) One reason for this state of affairs, it seems to me, lies not in any deficiency in the topic selection of social historians, but in the fact that the Soviet oil industry had a quite different relationship to broader Soviet society than that which has historically obtained in the capitalist world. It is common knowledge that, at the all-Union budgeting level and at least following Stalin-era autarky, the Soviet Union relied heavily on hard currency and barter items obtained in exchange for the export of oil (Kotkin 2001 , Gaidar 2007 . But at every level of the Soviet system below the federal budget, oil did not directly produce the major social effects and transformations that scholars have long focused on in other oil producing countries. There were no capitalist oil booms that fed into to massive new social inequalities or to high profile, highly politicized wars among private oil companies -both characteristics of the discovery of oil in the United States as described by Sabin (2005) or Davis (1998) In the Soviet-era Perm Region, which is part of the Volga-Urals oil basin and the site of my own recent research on Soviet and Russian oil, the oil industry was among the least prestigious places to work even at the height of production in the 1970s. Soviet ideologies and practices emphasized Perm's urban factories, with their large labor forces and close links to visions of Soviet modernity and military power, over the rural, grimy, and low-paying jobs in the regional oil production association Permneft' . Western social historians were right that Soviet oil did not play such a central role in the social and cultural lives of Soviet citizens: oil and oil money occupied a quite different place -less visible, less prestigious, even less political -in the on-the-ground experience of Soviet non-capitalist modernity as compared to capitalist modernity.
russian history 41 (2014) 513-527 4 The anthropological literature on the postsocialist period is replete with examples in which all manner of actors discovered that the socialist period provided useful and important resources for navigating the new circumstances of the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Verdery and Burawoy 1999; Rogers and Verdery 2013) . These examples challenge the wisdom of labeling the Soviet past as a "curse" in any totalizing way, whether in the oil industry or in other segments of society. 5 Slavnika 2007:7-36 provides an excellent critical overview of recent scholarship on oil produced in Russian universities, research centers, and oil companies themselves. In my own research, I have found local history publications from oil towns and districts to be a crucial source on both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
A key part of the story of the post-Soviet years is the movement of oil from periphery to center in the social and cultural discourses and practices of ordinary Russian citizens (see also Rogers 2014a). Most of the Soviet-era elements of this story remain, however, to be written. Only with a good deal more scholarly attention to the social and cultural history of Soviet oil will we be able to fully appreciate the way its legacies helped shape the post-Soviet period -and to decide whether those ways can be fairly judged a "curse."4 Recent Russiabased and Russian-language scholarship is advancing this field rapidly, with important contributions by scholars such as A. A. Igolkin (1999a; 1999b; , M. V. Slavnika (2007) , Vladimir Gel'man and Otar Marganiya (2010) and others.5
A second arena from which we can expect new insights into post-Soviet oil is the interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies and, more broadly, scholarship that understands some of the social and cultural force of oil to be caught up in material qualities and technological processes. When Gustafson writes of the physical legacy of Soviet oil, he has in mind the geological distribution of oil fields and the infrastructure that grew up around exploiting them in the context of larger Soviet political economy. When he writes of oil technologies, he generally means exploration and extraction techniques and the ways in which they enable or disable the effective and efficient exploitation of an oilfield. Indeed, "technology transfer" plays a major role in Wheel of Fortune, and some of the most interesting parts of the book focus on the specific kinds of Western drilling technology and oilfield management techniques -such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling -that boosted output in Soviet brownfields in the 2000s.
For scholars taking on board the insights of various strains of science and technology studies, however, there is much more to be said about the mutual implications of natural resources, infrastructures, technology, and human affairs. In his recent and acclaimed Carbon Democracy (2011), for instance, Timothy Mitchell argues that a new route into studying the intersection of oil and politics involves actually following the flows of oil and the strategies and tactics used to challenge and protect its production and distribution channels. Crucially, these are not just strategies and tactics enacted by corporate and political leaders of the sort followed by Gustafson, but by a much wider spread of actors including oil workers and oil consumers (from the world's navies to Americans driving in cars with V8 engines). Following the carbon itself, as Mitchell puts it, affords striking new perspectives on a range of issues, from labor politics to the organization of the international petrodollar system to the origins of the Cold War. Mitchell suggests, for instance, that the materiality of the nineteenth-century coal industry lent itself to mass labor protests and strikes that won democratic concessions by virtue of their these actions' ability to interrupt the all-important movement of coal along rail lines. The transition to oil -lighter, more fluid, more easily transportable (especially by tanker), and also relying on much smaller labor forces for extraction -has, it follows, often been an effort to skirt the material constraints that coal as an energy source helped to impose on capitalist accumulation and corporate power.
The recent and forthcoming work of Andrew Barry (e.g. 2010) most closely applies the insights of science and technology studies to the case of former Soviet oil. Based on research along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (btc) pipeline, for instance, Barry fashions an innovative analysis of pipeline metallurgy as part of a "sociomaterial assemblage." Pipelines and other material/technological aspects of the oil industry, in this view, are not inert materials shaped by more real social and economic forces. Nor are they simply items of "technology transfer" to be judged by how efficiently they extract and move oil. Pipelines are, rather, dynamic co-constitutors of those forces and processes. They have important implications for the shaping of broader political fields, especially when, as was the case in Georgia, they fail to work as promised and, in doing so, produce Parliamentary inquiries, ngo campaigns, other contested forms of expertise and knowledge, and, in general, the "stuff" of politics.
Steven Collier's (2011) study of Soviet and post-Soviet city planning also takes up the materiality of infrastructure in the hydrocarbon sector. Collier's fieldwork, conducted in the small industrial city of Belaia Kalitva in Rostov oblast', showed how deeply the infrastructural design and function of Soviet cities relied on a specifically socialist vision of urban life. As parts of this workplace-based and collectivist vision, heat and power for the city were generated and provided by the local factory, and there were no individual energy meters in apartments, for there was no need to measure consumption at an individual level. In the post-Soviet period, the intransigent materiality of this infrastruc- showing how a physical quality of oil-its depth beneath the region-became tightly wrapped up in Lukoil-Perm's efforts to legitimate and market itself through corporate sponsorship. The company's corporate social responsibility campaigns often assertively aligned the depth of the oil deposits managed by Lukoil-Perm with the historical and spiritual depth attributed to local cultural forms, and did so as part of efforts sought to draw attention away from some other qualities of oil that many in the Perm Region found objectionable, notably its toxicity during refining. On corporate relationships with local communities in the world of post-Soviet oil, see also Yessenova 2012 and Stammler and Peskov 2008. provide heat to the city after privatization? What if it went bankrupt? How could individual energy consumers be fashioned when it was a technical impossibility to meter and bill individual apartments for energy consumption, at least without tearing out the walls of every apartment in the city order to reconstruct the heating infrastructure? Collier situates these fascinating, ground level dilemmas in an innovative Foucaultian account of the Soviet Union as a biopolitical project, and in this respect differs somewhat from both Mitchell and Barry in choice of conceptual paradigm.6 For my purposes here, however, these scholars share a concern with the ways in which the material infrastructures and technologies of the hydrocarbon sector are powerfully implicated in political processes in ways that scholarship in the Wheel of Fortune genre is not well positioned to grasp. Whereas Gustafson and others see technologies and material infrastructures as elements in the play of grand state politics and corporate competition, this emerging strand of research on oil and gas looks to much more elaborate and intricate interfaces between humans and the material world, and does so with the goal of rethinking the ways in which the field of politics works in fundamental ways (see also Richardson and Weskalnys 2014) .7
I have argued that, in comparison to other parts of the world, scholarship on Russia and the former Soviet Union is notable for the relative dearth of writings on oil that provide alternatives to Wheel of Fortune's narrative genre. There is, to be sure, a great deal of instructive literature in political science, but oil is just beginning to catch on as a topic of broader historical and social scientific research on the region. I have pointed to new social histories and to science and technology studies as two arenas in which we can discern a gathering wave of scholarship that should considerably expand and diversify scholarship on oil in the former Soviet Union. Additional research topics common in the study of oil elsewhere in the world are also likely have an impact on the study of post-Soviet oil in the coming years. Promising examples include: the intersection of cultural production, mass spectacle, and the performative aspects of state-building in oil-producing states (Coronil 1997; Apter 2005; retort 2005) ; the "sociology of resource rents," which follows the channels along which states spend accumulated oil wealth (Hertog 2011) ; and the effects neoliberal restructuring on the ways in which the oil industry interacts with states and societies (Sawyer 2004; Shever 2012; Appel 2012) .
Judging from the state of scholarship on oil elsewhere in the world, then, there is a number of compelling directions in which research on Soviet and post-Soviet oil is likely to move in the next decade. The goal, however, should not be simply to apply theories generated elsewhere in the oil-producing world to the post-Soviet context. Although this is useful as an opening move, we should not underestimate the many significant historical and contemporary differences between Soviet and post-Soviet oil-exporters and the family of petrostates that prominently includes Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Venezuelaall of which grew up in the wake of one or another version of Euro-American imperialism. Given both basic differences and under-researched similarities and connections between colonial/postcolonial and socialist/postsocialist oil (Rogers 2014b) , there is reason to hope that new research on oil in the former Soviet Union will provide not just new cases studies using established theory, but some production for export as well -that is, insights that will challenge and expand our understandings of the ways in which oil has entered human social, cultural, political, and economic lives well beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union itself.8
